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NOMOS AND CINEMA
Richard K. Sherwin
Today we have law on the books, law in action, and now, law in the
image .... Law lives in images that today saturate our culture and that
have a power all their own.'
What does it mean to say law lives in the image? One may offer sev-
eral responses. First, in a pragmatic sense, the practice of law today
increasingly makes use of visual images. Visual evidence at trial includes day-
in-the-life videos, digital graphics, accident and crime reconstructions, as well
as long-distance testimony via closed-circuit television.2 The proliferation
of visual surveillance-from police vehicles and security cameras to amateur
videos-has also made its mark inside the courtroom. One need only call
to mind the defense's sophisticated digital reconstruction of George
Holliday's fortuitously captured images of Los Angeles police officers
beating Rodney King.' Even legal argument has taken to the screen. In a
growing number of trials videos are being used as part of closing argument.
In one case a video replaced oral argument altogether.4
Law lives in images. We make sense of reality by drawing upon the
stories and storytelling modes that are most familiar to us.5 And these days,
* Professor of Law, New York Law School. I would like to thank Michael Asimow, Paul
Bergman, and the UCLA Law Review for the opportunity to participate in a stimulating and well-
organized conference on a subject of growing significance.
1. Austin Sarat, Imagining the Law of the Father: Loss, Dread, and Mourning in The Sweet
Hereafter, 34 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 3, 9, 39 (2000).
2. See Richard K. Sherwin, Law/Media/Culture: Legal Meaning in the Age of Images, 43
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 653, 653-54 (1999-2000).
3. See RICHARD K. SHERWIN, WHEN LAW GOES Pop: THE VANISHING LINE BETWEEN
LAW AND POPULAR CULTURE 272 n.38 (2000) (describing the defense's digital reorchestration of
George Holliday's videotape to persuade jurors that Rodney King's movements "caused" Los
Angeles police officers to strike him with their batons); see also Richard K. Sherwin, The Narrative
Construction of Legal Reality, 18 VT. L. REV. 681, 691 (1994).
4. See Standard Chartered PLC v. Price Waterhouse, No. CV 88-34414 (Super. Ct.
Maricopa Co., Ariz. 1989).
5. See, e.g., JEROME BRUNER, ACTS OF MEANING 80 (1990) ("[Wlhile we have an
'innate' and primitive predisposition to narrative organization that allows us quickly and easily
to comprehend and use it, the culture soon equips us... through its tool kit and through the
traditions of telling and interpreting in which we soon come to participate."); HAYDEN WHITE,
TROPICS OF DISCOURSE 60 (1978):
What the historian must bring to his consideration of the record are general notions of
the kinds of stories that might be found there, just as he must bring to consideration of the
1519
1520 48 UCLA LAW REVIEW 1519 (2001)
television and film are by far the most popular sources of the stories and
story forms that we all know.6 It should hardly prove surprising to find trial
lawyers importing popular film stories and characters as well as familiar cine-
matic styles into their courtroom performances. For example, Oliver
Stone's Natural Born Killers7 served, in different ways, both the prosecutor
and the defense in a recent Georgia murder case.8 Francis Ford Coppola's
malevolent organized crime characters from The Godfather9 have served
more than one prosecuting attorney." And in one complex organized crime
case a defense attorney skillfully used a humorous and surreal cinematic sto-
rytelling style to transform his "mafia wannabe" client into a harmless buf-
foon." It was like watching a Quentin Tarantino movie, 2 or a scene from
the comedic imagination of Woody Allen. 3
Popular images of lawyers, criminals, and the legal system help people
to understand, or think they understand, the reality these images depict.
Whether accurate or not, these are the images that people carry around in
their heads. 4 When they come into court these are the images that they
bring with them. For good or for ill, trial lawyers will have to work with, or
around, the images that circulate within the popular imagination. And to
problem of narrative representation some notion of the "pre-generic plot-structure" by
which the story he tells is endowed with formal coherency. In other words, the historian
must draw upon a fund of culturally provided mythoi in order to constitute the facts as
figuring a story of a particular kind ....
Id.
6. See Gregor Goethals, The Electronic Gold Calf, in VIDEO ICONS & VALUES 64 (1991):
Television tells stories that are readily identifiable and offer reassurance; they provide
"something of the elementary, the primary, the fundamental and stable." Without some
commonly accepted narratives that articulate the truths and falsehoods, the values and
disvalues of a culture, we would find life intolerable disorienting. In this sense, televi-
sion's entertainment programs may speak to a human need for identity, both individual
and social.
Id.
7. NATURAL BORN KILLERS (Warner Bros. 1994).
8. See Beasley v. State, 269 Ga. 620, 627 (1998).
9. THE GODFATHER (Paramount Pictures 1972).
10. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Graziano, 331 N.E.2d 808, 813 (Mass. 1975); Jeremiah
Donovan, Some Off-the-Cuff Remarks About Lawyers as Storytellers, 18 VT. L. REV. 751, 753
(1994) (referring to the prosecution's invocation of images from the Godfather in United States v.
Bianco, No. H-90-18 (D. Conn. July 16, 1991)).
11. See Donovan, supra note 10, at 759.
12. See SHERWIN, supra note 3, at 30-31.
13. See Philip N. Meyer, "Desperate for Love": Cinematic Influences Upon a Defendant's
Closing Argument to a Jury, 18 VT. L. REV. 721, 748-49 (1994).
14. See AL RIES & JACK TROUT, POSITIONING: THE BATTLE FOR YOUR MIND (1981);
Vicki L. Smith, Prototypes in the Courtroom: Lay Representations of Legal Concepts, 61 J.
PERSONALITY& SOC. PSYCHOL. 857 (1991).
greater or lesser degrees of self-awareness, they do. 5 Teaching cultural legal
studies (for example, in courses on law and popular culture) can help to train
lawyers to be better storytellers. It can also help litigators not only to
discern the narrative strategies that are marshaled against them but also to
defuse and counter those narratives with effective stories of their own. 6
That is the pragmatic payoff of learning more about popular images of
the law. Society's shift to visual literacy is opening up a new professional
tool kit for effective lawyering. It behooves contemporary legal practitio-
ners to study these new tools with care in order to hone their craft. In the
years ahead it will become increasingly difficult not to practice law on the
screen, whether in court or out."
From a more academic ("cultural studies") point of view, popular legal
representations also have a lot to tell us. The kinds of images that find
their way into law films-the stories that are told, the character types that
are portrayed-help to inform us about the society we live in. For example,
popular legal representations serve as a cultural barometer revealing press-
ing needs, fantasies, and anxieties, as well as beliefs, hopes, and aspirations
that are circulating in society. These narrative elements shape and inform
the way we understand current legal issues, notorious trial outcomes, and
the role of law in society in general. 8
In my recent book, When Law Goes Pop,9 I discuss in greater detail
both the pragmatic (rhetorical) aspect of visual legal representations and
the contribution they can make to cultural analysis and critique. In this
Essay, I want to concentrate on a less familiar aspect of cultural legal stud-
ies. I want to consider the law film as a form of jurisprudence.2" Film, at its
15. See, e.g., NEAL FEIGENSON, LEGAL BLAME: How JURORS THINK AND TALK ABOUT
ACCIDENTS (2000); Anthony G. Amsterdam & Randy Hertz, An Analysis of Closing Arguments to
a Jury, 37 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 55 (1992).
16. See generally Marc Galanter, An Oil Strike in Hell: Contemporary Legends About the Civil
Justice System, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 717, 725 (1998) ("[Flolklore expresses deep and abiding senti-
ments and perspectives, and examining it can illuminate our dispositions that are otherwise diffi-
cult to fathom .... My point is how deeply this kind of discourse has penetrated current debate
about legal policy.").
17. This includes litigating cases in the mass media. See SHERWIN, supra note 3, at 141-52
(discussing the litigation-public relations phenomenon).
18. See id. at 73-78; see also PATRICIA EWICK & SUSAN S. SILBEY, THE COMMON PLACE
OF LAW: STORIES FROM EVERYDAY LIFE (1998); Barbara Ynguesson, Popular Legal Culture:
Inventing Law in Local Settings, 98 YALE L.J. 1689 (1989).
19. SHERWIN, supra note 3.
20. To date the jurisprudence of film has been pursued by only a handful of legal scholars.
See, e.g., SHERWIN, supra note 3, at 171-203 (examining both the original and the remake of
Cape Fear (CAPE FEAR (Melville-Talbot Productions 1962); CAPE FEAR (Amblin Entertainment
et al. 1991)), TWIN PEAKS: FIRE WALK WITH ME (New Line Cinema 1992), and other films for
insights into popular cultural beliefs about law, lawyers, and the possibility (or impossibility) of
approximating truth and justice in the legal system); John Denvir, Capra's Constitution, in LEGAL
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best, like all forms of art, provides a way of understanding significant shifts
in ways of knowing and of being in the world. In addition to fresh episte-
mological and ontological insights, film also serves as an important source
of normative vision. It can help us to understand the way things are (or
how we perceive them to be), how life is lived now, so to speak, and how
we might learn to live better, more wisely.
This claim should begin to shed light on the title I have chosen for
this Essay: Nomos and Cinema. It alludes to perhaps the most well-known
work by the late Robert Cover of Yale Law School, Nomos and Narrative.2
It is hard to believe that we have nearly reached the twentieth anniversary
of that groundbreaking essay. Its brilliance and far-sightedness have not
lessened over the years. I have written about Cover before, taking a some-
what critical stance toward his later "messianic" writings." I offer the pres-
ent work in homage to Cover's crucial insight concerning the
interpenetration of law and culture.
What does it mean today to say that law and culture interpenetrate?
Consider Robert Cover's opening paragraph in Nomos and Narrative:
We inhabit a nomos-a normative universe. We constantly create
and maintain a world of right and wrong, of lawful and unlaw-
ful .... No set of legal institutions or prescriptions exists apart from
the narratives that locate it and give it meaning. For every constitu-
tion there is an epic, for each decalogue a scripture. Once under-
stood in the context of the narratives that give it meaning, law
becomes not merely a system of rules to be observed, but a world in
which we live.23
REELISM: MOVIES AS LEGAL TEXTS, at 118-32 (John Denvir ed., 1996) (arguing that the study of
Hollywood movies can change our understanding of constitutional theory); Exploring the Hidden
Domains of Civil Justice, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 425 (2000) (using film to explore the social,
psychological, cultural, and professional dimensions involved in the emergence and transforma-
tion of disputes); Norman Rosenberg, Young Mr. Lincoln: The Lawyer as Superhero, 15 LEGAL
STUD. F. 215, 227 (1991) (comparing film scenes to legal realist insights of the 1930s); Alison
Young, Murder in the Eyes of the Law, 17 STUD. L. POL. & Soc'Y 31 (1997) (bringing together
feminism, psychoanalysis, critical criminology, and film theory in an effort to explore "how
cinema is jurisprudence").
21. Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97
HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983). In traditional usage, nomos refers to conventional law and morality
("the norm of civilization") as opposed to physis or the uncontrived order of nature. See CHARLES
SEGAL, TRAGEDY AND CIVILIZATION: AN INTERPRETATION OF SOPHOCLES 4-5 (1981); G.B.
KERFERD, THE SOHPISTIC MOVEMENT 54 (1981). In this Essay I adhere to Robert Cover's some-
what idiosyncratic sense of nomos as a discrete normative world constituted by a repository
of inherited texts and a repertoire of specific meaning making practices..
22. Richard K. Sherwin, Law, Violence and Illiberal Belief, 78 GEO. L.J. 1785, 1795 (1990).
23. Cover, supra note 21, at 4-5.
Cover's cultural approach helps us to think more deeply about the
connections between law and justice, self-identity and legal consciousness,
and also about the integration of legal theory and legal practice. Thinking
more carefully about how legal meanings are made, unmade, or altered, and
how people's lives are affected in the process, is to a significant extent an
ethnographic task. But it also spans many disciplines.24 Thinking through
the legal culture also partakes in what has come to be known, for better or
worse, as the postmodern project of thinking without foundations. I want
to associate this postmodern perspective with the emerging cultural legal
studies movement.
Cultural legal studies embraces important insights from the critical
legal studies, critical race studies, and law and literature movements. It too
is broadly multidisciplinary, drawing insights from cultural anthropology,
cognitive psychology, linguistics, rhetoric, and media studies in order to
critically examine how legal meanings are constructed, and how they are
put to work from the courtroom to the law office to the culture at large."
For over a quarter of a century now, critical legal studies (CLS) scholars
have made important intellectual advances based in large part on the
strength of deconstructionist theory. Critical scholars have uncovered irra-
tionality and hidden ideology in appellate case law, and have excavated
strategies of power and knowledge in legal institutions as well as in the pat-
terns of legal discourse generally.26 The CLS movement lost steam, how-
ever, when it became clear that a steady diet of skeptical delight was
insufficiently nourishing. It is time for a new wave, a new passion."
24. See GEORGE E. MARCUS & MICHAEL M.J. FISCHER, ANTHROPOLOGY AS CULTURAL
CRITIQUE (2d ed. 1999).
25. This syncretic approach informs such recent works as ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM &
JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW (2000), GUYORA BINDER & ROBERT WEISBERG, LITERARY
CRITICISMS OF LAW (2000), FEIGENSON, supra note 15, and my own book, SHERWIN, supra note
3. See also ROSEMARY J. COOMBE, THE CULTURAL LIFE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIES (1998);
LAW AND THE ORDER OF CULTURE (Robert Post ed., 1991); SALLY ENGLE MERRY, GETTING
JUSTICE AND GETTING EVEN: LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS AMONG WORKING CLASS AMERICANS
(1990); AUSTIN SARAT & WILLIAM L.F. FELSTINER, DIVORCE LAWYERS AND THEIR CLIENTS:
POWER AND MEANING IN THE LEGAL PROCESS (1995); AUSTIN SARAT & THOMAS R. KEARNS,
LAW IN THE DOMAINS OF CULTURE (1998); ALISON YOUNG, IMAGINING CRIME (1996); Susan
S. Silbey, Making a Place for Cultural Analyses of Law, 17 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 39 (1992).
26. See Richard K. Sherwin, Lawyering Theory: An Overview, What We Talk About When
We Talk About Law, 37 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 9, 31-33 (1992).
27. See FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THE WILL TO POWER 523 (Walter Kaufmann ed., Walter
Kaufmann & R.J. Hollingdale trans., 1968) ("Value words are banners raised where a new bliss has
been found-a new feeling."); see also Peter Goodrich, Gay Science and Law, in RHETORIC & LAW
IN EARLY MODERN EUROPE 105, 121 (Victoria Kahn & Lorna Hutson eds., 2001) (urging a
renewal of the gay science, which Peter Goodrich describes as "the art and practice of the passion
for knowledge" and "a rhetoric of the senses, a practice and ethic of passion"); Nicola Lacey, Nor-
mative Reconstruction in Socio-Legal Theory, 5 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 131-57 (1996) (noting that
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Perhaps the key advance that cultural legal studies offers is to make
theory touch down. Multidisciplinary microanalyses of concrete legal prac-
tices counterbalance, without eradicating the need for, critical theory. Such
analysis also offers a way to complement CLS's prevailing ethos of suspicion
with strategies of affirmation. The constitutive process of legal meaning-
making and the power of legal meanings to enchant the mind may now be
studied as a culture-wide phenomenon. In this constructivist view, the
responsibility for meaning remains ours-on both a collective (cultural)
and individual (cognitive) level.
The phenomenology of legal meaning-making confronts us with the
shifting fortunes of enchantment and disbelief in society. The critical task
before us is to reflectively assess the specific conditions under which belief
or suspicion may be more preferable.28
To live in a nomos we need to know how to live. We need guidance,
education, and commitment. We need shared meaning-making practices
and a corpus of inherited texts. Out of these materials and practices we build
institutions, paradigms for behavior, and patterns of discourse. We agree
upon a shared repertoire of moves, "a lexicon of normative action," 29 that
we combine anew to meet the needs of our time.
Normative commitment is never simply a given. Normative yearnings
must be met anew in every generation. The meanings that hold a world
together must be actively experienced, performed, and thereby reenacted at
least on occasion, so that the wellsprings of commitment may be refreshed.
This elementary need points to the ongoing social function of ritual and
drama in the service of enchantment.
I use the word enchantment deliberately to evoke the eros of logos.
3'
Enchantment is an admittedly provocative way of thinking and talking
about rhetoric, persuasion, and belief. Through enchantment desire mixes
once the fantasy of a transcendent objective foundation for ethical beliefs is relinquished, it is pos-
sible to "re-enchant" the world).
28. See Richard K. Sherwin, A Matter of Voice and Plot: Belief and Suspicion in Legal Storytel-
ling, 87 MICH. L. REV. 543 (1988).
29. Cover, supra note 21, at 9; see also WERNER JAEGER, PAIDEIA, THE IDEALS OF GREEK
CULTURE, at xiv, xxvi (1939) ("[T]he basis of education is a general consciousness of the values
which govern human life.... The Greek trinity of poet, statesman, and sage embodied the state's
highest ideal of leadership.").
30. See VICTOR TURNER, DRAMA, FIELDS, AND METAPHORS 45, 49 (1979) (describing
communitas as a bond uniting people over and above any social bonds or structure and which is
particularly apparent at liminal moments of conflict and attempts at resolution).
31. See lOAN P. COULIANO, EROS AND MAGIC IN THE RENAISSANCE (1987); GORGIAS,
ECOMIUM OF HELEN (D.M. MacDowell ed., 1982) (5th century, B.C.); JOHN RAJCHMAN,
TRUTH AND EROS: FOUCAULT, LACAN, AND THE QUESTION OF ETHICS (1991).
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Nomoseli and em 152
with healing and persuasion." Enchantment evokes the power to compel
and be compelled.33 It is a strange compulsion, not entirely apprehended or
apprehensible by the rational mind. Hence, the historic fear of bewitch-
ment and magic that has dogged rhetoricians, playwrights, poets, and artists
from Socrates's generation to our own.34 Yet, once encountered, how can
we not be awed by the power of seduction, of becoming enamored, of falling
under the spell of love or beauty? To enchant is to blend power and
delight. It is the Sirens' song, "crying beauty to bewitch [Odysseus and his
men]."" Perhaps it is the same inhuman cry that sings "beyond the genius
of the sea," 36 echoing the "rage for order" that Wallace Stevens records at
Key West.37 Perhaps it is the same call that Martin Heidegger invokes
when he writes of "the echoing response to the first call of Being .... ,,38
With these words Heidegger links singing and thinking, the poet's way to
truth, art's domain. As Heidegger puts it: "Beauty is one way in which truth
occurs ... ." " "Setting up a world and setting forth the earth, the work [of
art] accomplishes this striving."4
Without enchantment and belief the force of law ultimately decays
into naked power alone. Then the thrill of control, and the various
gratifications (material and otherwise) that control brings, unites those who
rule.4 And among the ruled, in place of active commitment, fear becomes
32. See PEDRO LAIN ENTRALGO, THE THERAPY OF THE WORD IN CLASSICAL ANTIQUITY
(1970).
33. See JACQUELINE DE ROMILLY, MAGIC AND RHETORIC IN ANCIENT GREECE 77 (1975)
("[Siublime speech 'does not produce persuasion in the audience, but enchantment and
ecstasy....' (quoting LONGINUS, DIONYSIUS LONGINUS ON THE SUBLIME (William Smith
trans., London 1739) (200 A.D.))); see also COULIANO, supra note 31, at 107 (noting that
Giordano Bruno concerned himself with the possibility of "erotic manipulation of the individual
and the masses").
34. See, e.g., DAVID FREEDBERG, THE POWER OF IMAGES 378-428 (1989) (discussing the
history of idolatry and iconoclasm); see also PETER GOODRICH, OEDIPUS LEX: PSYCHOANALYSIS,
HISTORY, LAW 41-107 (1995) (tracing the history of antirhetoric, or rhetoric as a form of
antirhetoric, and of imagery that exists to efface itself in order to repress idolatry, sensuality, and
dishonor of a deity).
35. HOMER, THE ODYSSEY 210 (Robert Fitzgerald trans., Everyman's Library 1992) (800
B.C.).
36. Wallace Stevens, The Idea of Order at Key West, in THE PALM AT THE END OF THE
MIND 97 (1984).
37. Id. at 98.
38. MARTIN HEIDEGGER, POETRY, LANGUAGE, THOUGHT 9 (Albert Hofstadter trans.,
1971).
39. Id. at 56.
40. Id. at 49.
41. See ERICH AUERBACH, MIMESIS: THE REPRESENTATION OF REALITY IN WESTERN
LITERATURE 55 (1946) ("Grotesque and sadistic, spectral and superstitious, lusting for power
yet constantly trying to conceal the chattering of their teeth-so do we see the men
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the only cohesive society knows: fear of chaos and fear of pain in the face of
law's might.42 To escape this crude fate the normative vision that impels
law to span from the present toward a possible future is also needed. In this
sense, normative vision is law's life-blood. Without it, the bridge falls. Law
ossifies into imperial enforcement.43
Law is more than a system of rules and the fear of predictable conse-
quences. It is a world made up of meanings that are drawn from shared
texts and practices. It is a normative world, which means that embodied
within it is a moral point of view, a normative vision. In this sense, we may
say, along with Cover, that law plots a trajectory from the present to the
future. It is a bridge that crosses over from the present moment to possible
futures. Quoting Cover: "A nomos is a present world constituted by a sys-
tem of tension between reality and vision."44 Film is part of the universe of
meaning-making in which we all live. Film supplies at least some of the
narratives and the storytelling styles that situate our being in a normative
world. It offers normative visions that may point us toward some possible
future.
To illustrate my claims regarding nomos and cinema, I will focus in this
essay on Red,4" the final masterpiece of the late Polish filmmaker, Krzysztof
Kieslowski. It is the last in a trilogy of films called Blue,46 White,47 and Red.4"
of Ammianus' ruling class and their world."); SHADI BARTSCH, ACTORS IN THE AUDIENCE
(1994):
The atrocities of a Roman emperor corrupted by his power often found both audience
and victim in the theatrical and gladiatorial games of the city .... [W]hen an emperor's
audience fails to decode the spectacle before their eyes into reality and then to recode
their own response back into the feigned and theatrical, the outcome is death.
Id. at 1, 20.
42. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 17 (Herbert W. Schneider ed., Macmillan Pub-
lishing Co. 1958) (1651) ("It is men and arms, not words and promises, that make the force and
power of the laws.").
43. See Cover, supra note 21, at 16 ("The sober imperial mode of world maintenance holds
the mirror of critical objectivity to meaning, imposes the discipline of institutional justice upon
norms, and places the constraint of peace on the void at which strong bonds cease.").
44. Id. at 9.
45. RED (MK2 Productions SA et al. 1994).
46. BLUE (MK2 Productions SA et al. 1993).
47. WHITE (MK2 Productions SA et al. 1993).
48. All three films were written by Krzysztof Kieslowski and a Polish lawyer named
Krzysztof Piesiewicz, whom Kieslowski happened to meet while making a documentary on trials
under martial law. In titling these films after the colors of the French flag, Kieslowski signaled his
intent to create a series of symbolic, intertwining tales about the mythic foundational values that
they symbolize, namely: liberty, equality, and fraternity. Let it be said at once, however, that
these are by no means abstract studies. To the contrary, as Kieslowski himself put it, "Blue, white,
red: liberty, equality, fraternity .... The West has implemented these three concepts on a politi-
cal or social plane, but it's an entirely different matter on the personal plane. And that's why
Nomos and Cinema 1527
Each is a meditation on the symbolic values of the tricolored French flag:
liberty (blue), equality (white), fraternity (red). I believe Kieslowski's final
film is imbued with a profoundly ethical vision of contemporary life in
community with others under law. It is a vision that also reflects what
we have come to recognize as postmodern conditions. Whatever else the
word "postmodern" may mean, and there are surely more meanings than
we can bear (a sure sign of postmodernity), I offer the following signs of
the times:
(1) We have come to realize that we live in webs of meaning that are
of our own making; law, as Clifford Geertz has said, is a particular way of
imagining the real.49
(2) This constructivist insight in combination with new technologies
of simulation and mass communication have led to problems. For example,
distinguishing between truth and fiction,. reality and fantasy, reason and
desire has grown increasingly difficult in our time.50
(3) This confusion is aided and abetted by a massive proliferation of
images; we are so saturated with images that it is difficult enough just to
keep up, much less assess what they mean."1
(4) The commercial production of images places a premium on audi-
ence share, which in turn leads to a heightening of the sensational power of
52images to draw and maintain their hold upon the viewer's attention.
we thought of these films." KIESLOWSKI ON KIESLOWSKI 212 (Danusia Stok ed., 1995); see also
GEOFF ANDREW, THE THREE COLOURS TRILOGY 69 (1998):
[In these films] the metaphysical is incarnated by the physical. Rather than use fuzzily
romantic 'holy' images to portray epiphanies or transcendental experiences ... the Three
Colours films suggest the presence of the extraordinary or inexplicable by showing some-
thing that is ordinary or familiar in itself, in a context which is extraordinary or inexplicable.
Id. One may also describe this as a vision of immanence; each moment teems with redemptive
and tragic possibility. See WALTER BENJAMIN, Theses on the Philosophy of History XIV, in
ILLUMINATIONS 261 (Hannah Arendt ed., Harry Zohn trans., 1968) ("History is the subject of a
structure whose site is not homogeneous, empty time, but time filled by the presence of the
now. Thus, to Robespierre ancient Rome was a past charged with the time of the now which he
blasted out of the continuum of history."); EMMANUEL LEVINAS, TIME AND THE OTHER 132
(Richard A. Cohen trans., 1987) ("[Wlith Bergsonism one can think the human as the explosion
of being in duration. The human would be the original place of rupture ... the very advent of
mind ... the emergence of the new as duration.").
49. See CLIFFORD GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE 184 (1983).
50. See SHERWIN, supra note 3, at 15-39.
51. See JEAN BAUDRILLARD, FATAL STRATEGIES (1990); JAMES B. TWITCHELL,
CARNIVAL CULTURE 51 (1992) ("What characterizes the condition of culture since World War II
is... that now we have more signs that point nowhere.").
52. See SHERWIN, supra note 3, at 37.
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(5) Sensation, saturation, and speed tend to reduce depth as the viewer
rushes along the surface of the screen in an effort to keep up with the flow. 3
(6) Fragmentation, the rush of desire, and the contingent meaning of
juxtaposed images tend to destabilize categorization, undercut deliberation,
and displace linear causation for the sake of free association among ideas
and affects. 4
In When Law Goes Pop, I examine the impact of postmodem conditions
on law. In particular, I criticize the predominantly skeptical or disenchanted
attitude that characterizes a good deal of recent critical scholarship. I
contend that excessive skepticism does law no good."5 Fortunately, skep-
ticism does not have a lock on postmodem culture. There is another, more
affirmative kind of postmodernism.56 Affirmative postmodemism is post-
modem in its understanding of how we construct meaning in everyday life
and how self and social reality are built up from the different stories that we
tell ourselves and that we share with others in the course of our social and
professional practices. 7 It is also postmodem in its recognition of the
cognitive habits that help to construct and maintain the diverse
microidentities that comprise the self from one context to another. And it
is postmodem in its acceptance of contingency and of the disruptive,
uncontrollable surge of the irrational both within and without.
Even so, postmodemism need not be skeptical. For example, a post-
modem story might convey meaning by making novel connections or jux-
tapositions in the mind. Thus a narrative may be postmodern in its
nonlinear use of popular cultural images and symbols, but need not employ
these images and symbols in an insular or exclusively self-referential man-
ner. A story might concede the demise of the autonomous modern subject,
but still find meaning through the distributed self: an identity comprised
of multiple cultural and social constructs shared by others in particular com-
munities. In this postmodem but nonskeptical spirit, one might recognize
the irreducibility of truth and justice to any abstract metanarrative (for
example, a system based on axiomatic principles such as fairness, liberty, or
some felicific calculus) but still experience the vitality of a discrete truth or a
localized, embodied sense of justice.
53. See PAUL VIRILIO, THE AESTHETICS OF DISAPPEARANCE 35 (1991) ("[T]urned causal
by its excessive speed, the sensation overtakes the logical order.").
54. See SHERWIN, supra note 3, at 19-25 (discussing visual literacy and the ascendancy of
associative reasoning).
55. See id. at 186-203.
56. See id.; see also PAULINE MARIE ROSENAU, POST-MODERNISM AND THE SOCIAL
SCIENCES: INSIGHTS, INROADS, AND INTRUSIONS 57-60 (1992).
57. See BRUNER, supra note 5, at 116, 132-38.
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Abstraction may give way to particularity, contextuality, multiplicity;
judgment may turn toward characteristic voices and localized accounts. But
localization and contextualization are not fatal to meaning. It remains
possible to seek rather than abandon meaning for concepts like truth and
justice-even in the face of contingency, unpredictability, and spontaneity.
In this way, human depth remains. Internal forces (like motivation and
intention) rather than wholly external forces (like chance or fate) still
account for events and provide a basis for meaning and accountability.
Of course, to say as much is not to deny the presence of strange
irrational forces within and without-forces that can never be fully
mastered. Still, the ability to embrace meaning, to say "yes" to ethical
enchantment, remains intact. Indeed, rather than deny the contingency
and ultimate fragility of meaning, these now become the very conditions
that inform our shared responsibility for meaning's construction, mainte-
nance, and change.
The affirmative postmodern viewpoint takes us beyond demystifying
critique and the skeptic's stance of perpetual irony by embracing the possi-
bility of enchantment and wisdom. I would even go so far as to say that
the affirmative postmodern actor seeks the re-enchantment of ethics and
wisdom.58
This approach comports with what Richard Rorty and Clifford Geertz,
among other postmodern thinkers, refer to as philosophizing without foun-
dations. The goal is not to displace one system, or axiomatic principle, with
another. Its wisdom is local, contextual, relational, and contingent.
Immanent meanings may be cultivated or seized, a gift of the moment, but
they are not guaranteed. 9
I believe that the sort of ethical postmodern attitude that I have been
describing informs the normative vision that we find in Kieslowski's Red.
There is nothing romantic about his view. In many ways it is tragic.60 But
it eschews a temptation that has captivated many critics of postmodern dis-
enchantment. Kieslowski avoids nostalgia. He resists the temptation to
58. See FRANCISCO J. VARELA, ETHICAL KNOW-How: ACTION, WISDOM, AND
COGNITION 75 (1999) ("My presentation is, more than anything, a plea for a re-enchantment of
wisdom, understood as non-intentional action. This skillful approach to living ... opens up
openness as authentic caring.").
59. See JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, NAUSEA 131 (Lloyd Alexander trans., New Directions Pub.
Corp. 1964) ("The essential thing is contingency, I mean that one cannot define existence as
necessity. To exist is simply to be there .... ).
60. See SEGAL, supra note 21, at 408 ("The tragic poet becomes a kind of culture hero who
confronts the darker mysteries of life and by his art, like Oedipus by his god-given power, trans-
mutes the pollutions of an accursed past into blessings for his fellow citizens.").
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envision some unspoiled past, some distant age of Enlightenment whose
traditions and values simply await our embrace."
Kieslowski understands the limits of postmodern skepticism, but he
does not turn his back on the world we know. His challenge, and ours, is to
work through, by working with, current cultural conditions. We cannot
simply turn away.
The world Kieslowski depicts is familiar to us. Yes, this Polish direc-
tor's world, filmed in Geneva, in French, is our world too. It is part of the
multifaceted global culture that is forming around us-in all its fragmented,
contingent, and unreasoned glory. It is also a world of law, lawyers, and
judges. I believe that the ethical vision that it presents helps us to think in
new ways about law and justice in postmodern times.
In Red, Kieslowski tells the stories of three main characters: a retired,
disenchanted judge named Joseph Kern; a young lawyer named Auguste
Bruner, who is about to become a judge himself; and a young woman named
Valentine Dussaut, a student and part-time model, who fortuitously enters
and changes Kern's life, and perhaps Bruner's as well.
Who knows, perhaps the older Kern and the younger Bruner are the
same man subject to a different fate. Kieslowski leads us to wonder whether
we all lead lives that are contingent upon chance encounters. Each of us
might be different, might become another, unimaginable to us now at this
moment, but for, some unforeseen event in our lives, an event over which
we have no control whatsoever.
"Man's character is his fate," said the ancient Greek philosopher
Herakleitos.62 A paradoxical saying. Fate shapes character, but character is
also what we make of our fate. In Red we learn that both interpretations
may be true. But we also come to see that passive indifference, disen-
chanted fatalism, is a form of death in life, while the immanent call of the
redemptive moment, that moment of hope and deliberate change, calls us
to life.
Red is at least in part a film about the ramifications of disenchantment
and belief. It addresses the perennial question: What basis do we have for
affirmation and for wise judgment? Culture is an invaluable guide in this
matter. It helps us when we find ourselves wondering, what is there beyond
custom and habit to hold our normative universe together? According to
Cover, the creation and maintenance of a normative world rests upon three
pillars: a corpus of texts, educational discourse, and exemplary practices."
61. See Sherwin, supra note 28, at 555-57.
62. JOHN BURNET, EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY 141 (4th ed. 1969) (quoting Herakleitos).
63. See Cover, supra note 21, at 12-13.
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We need a source of meaning, a method of learning, and personal acts of
commitment.
In what follows, I apply these constitutive criteria to Kieslowski's Red.
I want to show how a particular cultural text, in this instance a film, can
provide insight into the ongoing process of world building. Kieslowski con-
veys a normative vision in Cover's sense precisely by (1) identifying sources
of meaning and affirmation in contemporary life, (2) presenting ways of
learning from those sources, and (3) evoking the power of enchantment
through which exemplary acts express and inspire commitment.
Notably, the normative vision presented here is neither instrumental
nor deontological. Kieslowski does not speak in terms of individual
entitlements, nor does he calculate pleasure and pain. He identifies no
system of principles from which we may assess how to relate to or judge
others. In Kieslowski's normative universe people learn from chance
events, from the immediacy of experience in relation to others, and from
critical self-reflection upon that experience. Meaning is an immanent
possibility. It hinges on attentiveness to what the lived moment offers.
Attentiveness, however, may be blocked by habits of thought, memory, and
emotion-habits that are manifest in self-fulfilling patterns of behavior that
tend to reinforce the sameness of lived experience. In this sense we may say
that character is fate, the sum of our life history. But our fate is not sealed.
The possibility of redemptive change, through chance, openness, trauma,
and critical reflection, remains. 4
From the outset of Kieslowski's film we are introduced to a network of
connected, soon-to-be connected and soon-to-be disconnected lives.
Michel, whom we will never see, always speaks from a distance. We
hear his disembodied voice in telephone calls from some foreign land. He
never speaks face-to-face with his girlfriend, Valentine Dussaut. And when
he does speak, jealousy, insecurity, and perverse desire fill the air. These are
the hallmarks of his troubled relationship with Valentine. His opening
words in the first conversation with Valentine are typical of their every
exchange, "First it was busy, then the machine. Are you alone?... Is
someone there?" Ungrounded suspicion and jealousy are Michel's calling
cards. And when at one point he asks Valentine to get into bed, an appar-
ently familiar overture to some kind of phone-sex ritual that has plagued
Valentine before, we hear her sadly whisper, "Ah, it. commences." No
doubt about it, the connection between Michel and Valentine is troubled.
64. See Sigmund Freud, Inhibitions, Symptoms, & Anxiety, in THE STANDARD EDITION
OF THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 75, 159-60 (James Strachey ed.
& trans., 1959) (discussing working through neurotic repetition); see also VARELA, supra note 58,
at 30-31.
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Meanwhile, just across the street, unbeknownst to Valentine, the
young lawyer Auguste Bruner is also on the phone with his girlfriend,
Karin. Karin is a "personal weather reporter."65 She plies her trade by tele-
phone. In contrast to Michel's perpetual suspicions about Valentine's
faithfulness, Auguste exhibits an open, trusting nature toward Karin. Just
by the whisper of a kiss into the receiver, he has no doubt that she will
know it is him. Who else could it be? Auguste may not realize it now, but
Karin will soon betray him by sleeping with another man.
It is the same betrayal that occurred long ago in the life of another, now
far older man, the retired judge Joseph Kern. Kern has been disappointed
in life and in love. He spends his time in retirement eavesdropping on his
neighbors' telephone conversations. The travails and suffering that he
overhears only confirm his philosophy of disenchantment and cynical
indifference.
But chance changes everything. Or, at least, such is its power and
potential. And it is by chance that Valentine comes into Kern's life. The
agent is Kern's stray dog whom Valentine inadvertently strikes with her
car.66 The address inscribed on the injured dog's collar leads her to Kern's
home. Kern has placed himself outside the social loop. Alone, unconnected
to others, he no longer acts. He simply listens, furtively, to the private
sufferings of his neighbors, as their no-longer-private telephone conver-
sations amply reveal. The lies, the betrayals, the cruelty-here is human
nature laid bare. That, at any rate, is how Kern explains his life as
Valentine silently listens. To judge, he tells her, is pointless. Nothing
changes. Besides, who knows when forgiveness is better than condemnation?
Kern then tells an anecdote to explain. Once, thirty-five years ago,
when still a judge, Kern mistakenly acquitted a man. The man, he later
learned, was guilty. But upon making his own investigation into the matter
many years later, Kern also learned that the man subsequently married, had
three children and a grandchild, and was, as Kern puts it, "living in peace."
"Deciding what is true and what isn't now seems to me a lack of mod-
esty," Kern concludes. So he contents himself simply with listening. It is
65. Ironically, her inability to predict a storm on the English Channel will lead to her own
and her new lover's death at sea. By chance, Karin also happens to be one of Joseph Kern's neigh-
bors. His eavesdropping upon her conversations with Auguste Bruner leads Kern to conclude that
Karin's and Auguste's relationship will not last. "She is not the one he is looking for," Kern will
tell Valentine Dussant.
66. Arguably, the accident is not entirely fortuitous. Valentine momentarily loses her con-
centration when a strange sound of electronic interference comes on the car radio. It is the same
sound that we hear when Valentine first enters the room that contains Kern's eavesdropping
equipment. Could it be that Kern has somehow reached out to Valentine, that he is signaling his
need, that his interference with her life course is a call beckoning her into his orbit?
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like when he was a judge except that now he knows the stories he hears
are true. And the futile responsibility of judging has been lifted from his
shoulders.
Kern then recounts a story from his life. Over thirty-five years before a
man seduced and ran off with Kern's one and, as it turned out, only love.
Years later, the same man came before Kern in court. The roof of a market
that Kern's rival had been building collapsed. People were killed. Kern
condemned him. "It was a legal sentence," he tells Valentine. But Kern's
tone betrays his doubts. Indeed, it proved to be Kern's last judgment from
the bench. After issuing it he asked for early retirement.
But the tale does not end there. Valentine does not share Kern's dis-
mal view of life. Her fresh spirit wafts over his deadened one. Valentine
succeeds in reanimating something that had for many years lain dormant
within Kern. Old memories of lost love are stirred, perhaps along with the
inextinguishable power of love itself. He stopped believing, Kern tells
Valentine, but then he adds, "Maybe you're the woman I never met." If
only their paths had crossed when he was still young, perhaps she could
have changed his life. But perhaps she still can.
Consider this exchange between them. Kern has been leading
Valentine through the personal travails of his neighbors as their exposed
telephone conversations play out, one after the other, on the air inside
Kern's cramped living room. "Ah, next program, not very interesting,"
Kern will say. A mother who incessantly calls her daughter, bombarding
her with false complaints about ill health and lack of food, lies that now fall
on deaf ears. They barely conceal her desperate need for her daughter to
come, to ease the terrible suffering of loneliness. "Next program," Kern dis-
passionately intones, as if this conversation and the others that we have
heard were no more than a TV soap opera. As Andy Warhol has said,
''once you see emotions from a certain angle you can never think of them as
real again."67 This is what it is like when the real collapses into the insular
domain of free-floating images. Compassion loses its meaning. It is what
has become of Kern in the face of life's tragic disappointments. The suffer-
ing around (and within) him has destroyed his capacity to feel or care about
anyone.
But Valentine's response is different. She is repulsed both by Kern's
actions and by his cynical philosophy, and she tells him so. When Kern
says he cares for nothing, Valentine replies, "So stop breathing!"
67. ANDY WARHOL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF ANDY WARHOL 27 (1975); see also MARK
POSTER, THE MODE OF INFORMATION 63 (1990) (describing how TV ads operate as "floating sig-
nifiers" that convey "desirable or undesirable states of being... in a way that optimizes the
viewer's attention without arousing critical awareness").
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"Good idea," is Kern's nihilistic response. But Kern's long infatuation
with loss and death are about to end. In Valentine the breath of life is
strong. She radiates innocence, vulnerability, and compassion.
"You are mistaken," she tells Kern. "People aren't bad. It's not
true ... People may be weak sometimes." She then rushes in tears from his
house, but not before having bestowed a great gift. Her vibrant spirit opens
up a redemptive moment for Kern, and he realizes its potential.
After she departs he sits down at his desk to compose letters to each of
his neighbors in turn. In them Kern confesses his immoral and illegal acts
of spying. Kern's remembrance of lost love precedes the change. It is
against this backdrop that he understands, perhaps for the first time, the
real nature of his suffering and of the rage that he has been acting out in his
abusive and perverse relations with others. Kern's cynicism is but a defen-
sive shell, protecting him from the pain of unexpressed love.
Inhaling Valentine's breath of life revives Kern's hardened heart. He
will now repudiate fatalistic passivity and the paralysis of judgment that it
brings. In his first act of judgment Kern judges himself. Guilty. Passive
voyeurism, the reflection of his deadened spirit, must end. If character is
fate, now Kern will alter his fate by repudiating the perverse character that
he has become. Kern's chance connection with Valentine has stirred
memories of youthful love. But Valentine has done more. She has inspired
within him love of another sort: the selfless love of agape, a form of love
that aspires to spiritual or fraternal, rather than physical, consummation.
Kern's connection to others in the world will now be restored. Rather
than passively (and perversely) enjoy the spectacle of human suffering,
Kern will actively seek to untangle crossed connections and foster authentic
ones. Years of listening to people's stories of suffering and conflict, both on
and off the bench, have given him peculiar insight into the mysterious ways
of chance and into the vicissitudes of human interactions. Like Oedipus at
Colonus whose long years of exile culminate in divine sanctification, or
Prospero's fateful enchantments in Shakespeare's The Tempest,6" so too
Kern's years of lonely suffering seem to have bestowed upon him not only
tragic wisdom, but something more. Something akin to oracular vision, the
foresight of a fate god, or perhaps an oracle of law.69
68. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TEMPEST.
69. Throughout the film Kieslowski hints at Kern's unusual abilities, such as his prediction
of a sudden change of light, his seeming ability to influence the spin of a coin, and his prediction
that Auguste's and Karin's relationship is about to end. Indeed, Kern not only arranges for
Valentine and Auguste to meet, but he also seems to foresee Valentine's future. "Last night I
dreamed of you," he tells Valentine. "You were forty or fifty years old and you were happy."
"Will this happen?" Valentine will later ask Kern.
"Yes," he confidently replies.
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Kern will now set in motion ripples of fate that will change Valentine's
life, and perhaps young Auguste Bruner's life as well. For it is through
Kern's designs that their paths will finally cross. In this way the "mistake in
time" that long deprived Kern of the chance for a fulfilling relationship will
be rectified." The elderly Kern may not be able to court the young
Valentine himself, but he can reciprocate in a fashion the selfless love and
compassion that emanate from her. Kern will now use his knowledge and
revived sense of care for others to save the young Auguste Bruner from suf-
fering Kern's fate. No, Bruner need not replicate Kern's disappointment
and ensuing cynicism. And it is toward this end, inspired by and expressing
Valentine's compassion and selfless kindness, that Kern brings the two
together. Seeing their contentment will suffice.
Strange forces have been unleashed. The cherries on the slot machine
outside the caf6 near Valentine's apartment building have all lined up,
which means-according to the law of the conservation of chance-that
a correction is at hand. And so it is. That very day a photo of Valentine's
younger brother will appear in the newspaper above a caption announcing
an increase in the number of young Swiss heroin users. Another develop-
ment is also afoot. Karin is about to betray Auguste. And soon thereafter
Valentine will come to question her connection with Michel. It is against
this backdrop of trauma and flux that Kern sets in motion a chain of events
that leads Valentine's and Auguste's paths to cross.
Five separate lives, three relationships: Valentine's faltering connec-
tion with the perverse Michel, Auguste's betrayed relationship with the
fickle Karin, and Kern's transformative relationship with Valentine. How
easily each could become another. Auguste, a judge by film's end, also
spurned in love, and in so many other ways Kern's double, seems primed to
replicate Kern's disenchanted life. Just as Valentine, caught in Michel's
perverse gaze, might never pierce the veil of inauthenticity but for a chance
event, a fateful encounter.
Kieslowski has constructed a tightly woven network of relationships
that undergo significant reconfiguration. The nature and meaning of this
process of change teaches us about perversion and betrayal in our relations to
others and the price to be paid in personal suffering and disenchantment.
But another possibility also emerges. By reintroducing the power of love
and kindness into Kern's life, Valentine reveals the moment's redemptive
potential. And, of course, it is through Kern's reciprocal intervention that
With awe in her voice and face, Valentine says, "What else do you know? Who are you?"
The strangeness of Kern's power points toward the uncanny, a species of enchantment.
70. ANDREW, supra note 48, at 64.
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Valentine comes into Auguste's life, holding out the promise of a more
meaningful, more deeply committed relationship than either has known
before.
What Kieslowski has done here is to lay out a span of relational norms.
They range from the flawed (eros as use and consumption with its attendant
features and concomitants: the inauthentic self, the wounded lover) to the
authentic (unselfish compassion and authenticating care, as evidenced in
the relationship between young Valentine and Kern).
Forces of chance and contingency reign over all. Their central meta-
phors in the film are the weather report and the slot machine. Kieslowski
also uses familiar images to add significance to unstable relationships. For
example, Valentine's perverse connection with Michel aptly parallels her
part-time work as a model. A successful photo shoot culminates in a
twenty-five by sixty-foot-wide advertising banner featuring Valentine's face
in profile set against a red backdrop. The ad uses her face to sell a popular
brand of bubble gum. "A breath of life," reads the logo. An ironic message,
for Valentine does become a breath of life for Kern, though not for her cur-
rent lover, Michel. Indeed, like Michel's perverse and distant gaze, so too
the objectifying gaze of the prospective consumer mocks authentic ("face-
to-face") relationships. Here we witness unfulfilled desire being used and
used up, like chewing gum perhaps, or like any commodity that we take in
and spit out once its use is done. This is how we consume images
and objects everyday, for the use-value they offer. The pursuit of self-
gratification, trading on a fantasized relationship with the object of one's
gaze, serves as an apt model of narcissistic inauthenticity in our relationships
with others.7'
Kieslowski similarly presents us with a spectrum of authentic and defi-
cient relational norms in regard to judging. For example, we witness the
deficiency of Kern's judgments in connection with his illicit and cynical
eavesdropping upon his neighbors. Of his life as a judge, Kern says, "I never
knew if I was on the good side or the bad. Who knows if condemnation is
more just than mercy? Whatever we say, sooner or later something will
happen, all hell will break loose and there's nothing we can do about it."
He adds, "Here at least I know where the truth is. My point of view is bet-
ter than the courtroom." But what purpose can judgment serve when fate
remains inscrutable and resists every human effort to make justice rule?
71. The same tempest that brings Auguste Bruner and Valentine together on their trip
across the English Channel simultaneously causes Valentine's advertising poster to be taken down.
One might say that her inauthentic (commodified) being in the world is now giving way to an
authentic ("face-to-face") relationship with someone who is, unlike Michel, worthy and capable
of love. Decommodification precedes authentication.
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Kern's fatalism induces passivity and cynical indifference. Indeed, even
empathy in this dispensation fares no better.
In pure subjectivity the judge who wholly identifies with the fate of
the judged becomes forgetful of others. As Kern says, "I'd do the same if I
were them ... and that goes for everyone I've judged; given their lives
I would steal, I'd kill, I'd lie." Total empathy with the actor's subjective
reality prompts a forgiveness that paralyzes judgment. This too is a form of
detachment and indifference, a state of disconnection from the sorrow and
,pain that has befallen others, perhaps as a direct consequence of what the
accused has done. Indifference here is yet another sign of what it means to
dwell outside the lived experience of human relationships. Such a life can-
not escape the insular world of a particular "I." Only here it is the I fused
with the other, an I that could not have done otherwise. In short, the
inability to take responsibility for judgment or to consider the impact of
acts or judgments upon others characterizes both fatalistic and wholly
empathic judging. Both suffer from the insularity of unchecked narcissism.
By contrast, in wiser forms of judgment responsibility to and for the
other becomes central. Consider, for example, Kern's first act of judg-
ment: He turns himself in. The first sign of Kern's redemptive transfor-
mation is his taking responsibility for his perverse relationship to others
around him. Spurred by Valentine's impassioned and unselfish condem-
nation of his behavior Kern is no longer able to experience the suffering
of others as a disembodied spectacle-raw material for his personal amuse-
ment. Others are no longer commodities, like Valentine's profile, or the
TV images that we watch and discard once their value is used up.
Only when Valentine's revivifying spirit leads him to understand the
origin and meaning of his perverse relations with others is Kern able to
rekindle his own spirit of care and unselfish fellow-feeling. Only then does
he take active responsibility for Valentine, her younger brother, and for
others living around him. Indeed, by reaching out to his younger double,
by bringing Auguste Bruner and Valentine together, Kern redeems his own
life through another's. What was lost to him may now be gained in
Auguste's life. It is the quintessential enactment of agape.72 The shattering
72. See GENE OUTKA, AGAPE: AN ETHICAL ANALYSIS (1972); see also EMMANUEL
LEVINAS, ENTRE NOUS: ON THINKING-OF-THE-OTHER 105 (Michael B. Smith & Barbara
Harshav trans., Columbia University Press 1998) ("[l]n the relation of the Face, it is asymmetry
that is affirmed: at the outset I hardly care what the other is with respect to me ... he is above all
the one I am responsible for.").
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of indifference in the awakening of love for another precedes the possibility
of justice and authentic judging."
Justice in a world of chance and contingency points to life lived amid
forces beyond our control, the vicissitudes of desire, rage, love, and compas-
sion. Yet fraternity is built upon contingency and compassion in the face
of life's tragic possibilities. As Martin Luther King said, "Whatever affects
one directly affects all indirectly. We are all links in the great chain of
humanity."74  We are interconnected in ways we can barely begin to
fathom. At any moment, each of us might become another-an other even
to ourselves. Such is the power of chance and fate and the invisible
network of seen and unforeseen consequences that bind us all together.
Each of us is subject to controllable and uncontrollable forces from within
and without. Such is the source of our shared humanity. It is in this sense
that we can understand Kieslowski's words when he says, "the life of every
single person is interesting if you just look at it."75
I believe that Kieslowski's relational vision for law and justice, his
ethical universe of authentic ("face-to-face") relationships, models an ele-
mentary norm for law. It is a norm that stands apart from the aggregation
of individual self-interest as well as claims of systemic rights or entitlements
that center upon the autonomous self.76 Kieslowski's is an ethical vision
73. See LEVINAS, supra note 72, at 108 ("Justice comes from love.... Love must always
watch over justice."). Emmanuel Levinas and Kieslowski are closely linked in their shared
desire to shatter indifference. Compare LEVINAS, supra note 72, at xi ("It is this shattering of
indifference ... that constitutes the ethical event."), with ANNETTE INSDORF, DOUBLE LIVES,
SECOND CHOICES: THE CINEMA OF KRZYSZTOF KIESLOWSKI 181 (1999) ("Red is a film against
indifference.").
74. Martin Luther King, Jr., Facing the Challenge of a New Age, in A TESTAMENT OF HOPE
138 (James Melvin Washington ed., 1986). We must also bear in mind here the significant con-
tribution that feminist jurisprudence has made to an ethic of care and compassion. See, for
example, the seminal work of Lynne Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1574
(1987), and Toni M. Massaro, Empathy, Legal Storytelling, and the Rule of Law, 87 MICH. L. REV.
2099 (1989). Of particular interest in the context of ethical enchantment is Ruth Colker,
Feminism, Theology, and Abortion: Toward Love, Compassion, and Wisdom, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1011
(1989), which discusses the importance of aspirational thinking, the authentic self, compassion,
and wisdom. On a more cautionary note, it is important to consider the double-edged aspect
of the role of emotions in the legal decision-making process. See, e.g., Susan Bandes, Empathy,
Narrative, and Victim Impact Statements, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 361 (1996) (noting that even empathy
may have problematic effects under certain circumstances); Neal Feigenson, Accidents as
Melodrama, 43 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 741 (1999-2000) (describing the dangers associated with
personalizing legal blame and enhancing melodramatic effects to trigger jury bias); Neal R.
Feigenson, Sympathy and Legal Judgment: A Psychological Analysis, 65 TENN. L. REV. 1 (1997)
(discussing the danger of producing unfairly biased jury decisions through excessive subjectivity).
75. ANDREW, supra note 48, at 71.
76. Cf. Robert M. Cover, Obligation: A Jewish Jurisprudence of the Social Order, 5 J.L. &
RELIGION 65, 70 (1987) ("Rights, as an organizing principle, are indifferent to the vanity of vary-
inspired by the force of our obligation to the other. The rest follows from
this originary, meaning-generating moment. In Red Kieslowski conveys an
ethos of care and openness toward the other based on the moment's
redemptive possibility. In that possibility also lies the power of enchant-
ment and belief-the same mysterious power that impels commitment from
within, and that inspires commitment from without. Red tells us about the
fraternal force, the force of ethical commitment. It signifies responsibility
to and for the other. Geoff Andrew's apt summary is worth quoting in full:
We must reach out to others, through love, compassion and under-
standing, and we should accept that there are bonds between us
which we may not fully comprehend; to recognise our common
humanity, our equal worth as individuals with our own special needs,
desires, fears and responsibilities, is to accept our destiny. Only by
accepting the mysteries of existence for what they are can we proceed
towards a greater understanding of ourselves and others, unfettered
by any notions of ideological or moral absolutes.7
Emmanuel Levinas has written that it is before the face of the other
that we acquire moral consciousness."' Christian writers speak of agape,
through which two people meet in openness and affection, aware of one
another's inner lives.79 And in the Buddhist tradition, we find the word
prajnaparamita, which means supreme generosity."° These overlapping
meanings emphasize the supreme value of the other in the creation of an
ethical world, or nomos. This ethical vision lies at the heart of Kieslowski's
Red.
CONCLUSION
Post-CLS scholarship has increasingly turned to the role of law as a
meaning-making practice within society at large. As Clifford Geertz noted
early on, law is much more than a body of norms, rules, principles, and val-
ues. It is "a distinctive manner of imagining the real."8 Law is not just on
the books, or in the gap between books and practice. It is in people's heads
in the form of scripted expectations, popular story forms, and recurrent
images.
ing ends. But mitzvoths [obligations] because they so strongly bind and locate the individual must
make a strong claim for the substantive content of that which they dictate.").
77. ANDREW, supra note 48, at 76.
78. See LEVINAS, supra note 72, at 11.
79. See OUTKA, supra note 72, at 218.
80. See VARELA, supra note 58, at 69-70.
81. See GEERTZ, Supra note 49, at 173.
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A newly emerging cultural legal studies movement embraces, but also
takes us beyond, disembodied critical theory. It points toward rich micro-
analytic studies of highly contextualized, concrete legal practices. Using
a multiplicity of disciplines-such as cultural anthropology, cognitive psy-
chology, linguistics, media studies (including advertising and public rela-
tions), and rhetoric-legal scholars are assessing more closely the legal
meaning-making process, in court and out. In this view, law is both a by-
product and a coconstituent of popular culture; one domain informs and
shapes the other.
This cultural approach operates within a postmodem framework, but it
resists the skeptical strain in postmodem thought and expression. Rather
than deny the contingency and ultimate fragility of meaning, these now
become the very conditions that inform our shared responsibility for
meaning's construction, maintenance, and change.
To reconceive our legal system along these affirmative postmodern
lines requires that we rethink such core Enlightenment ideals as the univer-
sality of reason and truth, the stability of the autonomous self, and the pre-
sumption of progress that these ideals purportedly guarantee. The priority
traditionally assigned to deductive and inductive logic, rationalist agency
and calculative reason, must also undergo review so that notions of plural-
ity, complexity, contingency, and uncertainty may be more fully and delib-
erately considered. In this way, the unduly repressive inclinations of the
modem rationalist's mindset may be eased, and the nonrational forces that
surge within and around us-fate, chance, fury, and desire-may be more
readily assessed as coconstitutive of self, social and legal reality. This too
82
opens the door to enchantment.
Psuchagogein is the ancient Greek word for "raising spirits. ' 3 It is a
word that evokes the eros of Logos, the mysterious power of language itself.
It is this power that claims us in words and images-in poetic utterance, the
gift of the Muses.' Such words and images instill sorrow and longing, pity
and fear, or perhaps joy, pleasure, and ecstatic delight in the heart and soul
of the one who listens. And here we approach the essence of the rhetori-
cian's art: to move the soul where he wills.
It is the function of art, poetry, and rhetoric alike to make a particular
form of truth (and reason and justice) sufficiently compelling to lead the
subject to a specific judgment or course of action in a particular context. It
is the particular function of tragic poetry and narrative to make the con-
82. See SHERWIN, supra note 3, at 205-33.
83. Id. at 222.
84. See id. at 204 (citing Hesiod on the speech of the Muses).
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tingency, multiplicity, and complexity of truth and reason compelling.
Indeed, it must do so even in the face of the irrational forces that surround us.
Tragic wisdom urges us to critically discern the reality- or meaning-making
power and technique of rhetoric, but it also compels us to acknowledge the
limits of reason and the contingency of truth and meaning. By describing
in dramatic detail the effects of forces like chance and desire on human life,
tragic narrative delineates the bounds of rationality. In this way, it invokes
a sense of finitude, humility, fear, and pity, and in doing so the tragic
perspective brings into focus the shifting patterns of meaning and mystery
that rationality and irrationality create in dynamic disequilibrium. These
patterns constitute the lived realities of truth and reason, law and justice, in
our time.
Robert Cover was surely one of the early advocates of a cultural
approach to law and legal meaning-making. Law, he said, is a world in
which we live. It is a world that is made up of meanings drawn from shared
texts and practices that embody a normative vision. In this sense, we may
say, along with Cover, that law plots a trajectory from the present to the
future. It is a bridge that crosses over from the present moment to possible
futures.
Cultural texts, including film, can provide insight into the ongoing
process of world-building. Kieslowski's film Red is such a film. It teaches
ways of living and judging. The normative vision at work here is neither
instrumental nor deontological. It emerges neither on the basis of individ-
ual entitlements or some felicific calculus of pleasure and pain. It covets
no system of principles from which we may assess how to relate to or judge
an other. Kieslowski's film comports with postmodern conditions. In
philosophical terms, it is a way of doing theory without foundations. This is
what thinkers like Friedrich Nietzsche and Martin Heidegger and Richard
Rorty have urged in their work. We must escape the grip of metanarratives,
abstract systems, universals, and dogmas of all kind. It suggests an affirmative
way to address the vital questions that we face under postmodern con-
ditions: Where do we turn for normative guidance in order to nourish and
bind belief? How do we sustain meaningful relationships among others
within a meaningful normative universe-within the nomos that we
inhabit?
Today, whatever else may be said about the possibilities of enchant-
ment and affirmation, the normative impulse cannot escape or supplant
postmodern conditions. The more affirmative kind of postmodernism that I
have sought to evoke here offers insights into how we construct meaning in
everyday life. It is postmodern in its notion of the way self and social reality
are built up from the different stories that we tell ourselves and share with
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others in the course of our social and professional practices. It is also post-
modem in its recognition of the cognitive habits that help to construct and
maintain the diverse microidentities that comprise the self from one con-
text to another. And it is postmodern in its recognition of chance, con-
tingency, and the disruptive, uncontrollable surge of irrational forces both
from without and from within.
I hope this begins to suggest what it might mean to adopt an affirma-
tive postmodern understanding of the interpenetration of law and culture.
The challenge is to integrate critical constructivist insights regarding how
the meanings we live by are made and disseminated (by whom and with what
effect?) with the human capacity to affirm deep cultural values and beliefs.
Only then may we avoid the dangers posed by pervasive disenchantment:
whether in the form of detached irony or in the modernist mindset's denial
of the "magic" or mythic enchantment of words and images.
At the core of Kieslowski's ethical vision is a fraternal force, a force of
normative commitment. It embodies our responsibility to and for the other.
These fateful possibilities for law's future are hardly reducible to rational
calculation, or even to rational principles of autonomy or contract-based
entitlement. They point instead to a form of ethical enchantment. This
normative vision directs us to the eros of thinking and judging that we find
in Michel Foucault and Jacques Lacan and that harks back to early Greek
thought as well. It recalls Henri Bergson's and Levinas's immanentist
ontology5 and the mind's passion to seek meaning and perhaps also wisdom
in our lives among others.8 6
Unlike judgments in which the self operates in isolation, disconnected
from others, wiser forms of judging make responsibility to and for others the
most central feature. This obligation is prior to all contract. And here we
may adopt Levinas's crucial correction of Heidegger: It is the call of
the other, not the call of Being, to which we owe primary allegiance.8" This
fateful choice marks the elevation of ethics over esthetics.
85. See LEVINAS, supra note 72, at xi ("The main intent here is to try to see ethics in rela-
tion to the rationality of the knowledge that is immanent in being, and that is primordial in the
philosophical tradition of the West .... ").
86. See RAJCHMAN, supra note 31, at 1:
One of the great questions of ancient philosophy was: What is the eros of thinking?
What is the eros of the peculiar sort of truth of which philosophy is the pursuit? ... It is
in order to rediscover such questions that I have turned to the work of ... Jacques Lacan
and Michel Foucault .... [Elach of them in different ways re-erotized the activity of
philosophical or critical thought for our times.
Id.
87. See LEVINAS, supra note 72, at 232-33.
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To live well in the law we need to affirm and commit ourselves to an
ethical vision. This requires more than self-gratification in the here and
now. In order to plot law's possible future we need ethical enchantment.
We need the force of belief and interpersonal commitment. Demystifica-
tion is not enough to live on.
In the prologue to his Prometheus Unbound,88 Shelley gave eloquent
expression to this thought when he wrote: "[U]ntil the mind can love, and
admire, and trust, and hope, and endure, reasoned principles of moral con-
duct are seeds cast upon the highway of life which the unconscious passen-
ger tramples into dust ...
If we are enchanted with the affirmative ethical vision that postmod-
ern conditions allow, if we learn its cultural texts, including visionary films
like Kieslowski's Red, and practice its ethical norms in acts of interpersonal
commitment, perhaps we can claim its nomos as our own.
88. SHELLEY'S PROMETHEUS UNBOUND (Lawrence John Zillman ed., University of
Washington Press 1959) (1820).
89. Id. at 127.
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